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it. Focussing on England and Wales, this article considers how an emphasis on
culture-change outcomes undermined the political success of New Labour’s
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marked political divide over the role of legislation in shaping public attitudes and
behaviours.
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Introduction
Throughout modern history, British alcohol policy has been characterised
by efforts to achieve cultural change through legislation. While the primary
goal of licensing law has always been the prevention of disorder and the
regulation of markets, there are numerous instances of governments using
licensing reform as a mechanism by which to ‘civilise’ popular drinking
cultures (Greenaway, 2003; Jennings, 2007; Nicholls, 2009, 2010). Culture-
change is a prominent concern in the major Royal Commissions and
Parliamentary Committee reports on alcohol published over the last century.
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Both the ‘Peel Commission’ (1899) and the Royal Commission on Licensing
(1931) argued forcefully that the State had both the duty and the capacity
to change drinking culture (House of Commons, 1899, 1931). The Report of
the Departmental Committee on Licensing (1972, known as the ‘Erroll
Report’) was more circumspect, arguing that only extreme legislative
interventions could have a significant impact on consumption. However, it
also emphasised that it was ‘not endorsing the hypothesis that licensing
legislation has no effect whatsoever on drinking behaviour’ (House of
Commons, 1972, p. 46).
The Erroll Report concluded that because most drinkers were moderate they
should not be subject to undue legislative interference in their free choice to
drink. To this extent, it reflected a broad trend in British alcohol policy since
the early 1960s away from the notion that licensing should seek directly to
affect drinking cultures. Nevertheless, the pull of the culture-change agenda
remains powerful and recent debates on alcohol policy have been dominated by
questions around national drinking cultures and the capacity, or otherwise, of
Government to influence behaviour in this regard.
Research on alcohol policy since 2000 has emphasised the significant
problems it poses for government. Baggott shows that while New Labour’s
alcohol policy was characteristic of the ‘Third Way’ attempt to ‘chart a middle
way between state control and free markets’, it suffered from the ‘departmental
pluralism’ that has historically bedevilled attempts to construct coherent
alcohol policy as well as the difficulty of negotiating the interests of the many
competing stakeholders involved (Baggott, 2010, p. 136). Greenaway (2011)
argues that a core New Labour policy of licensing deregulation became drawn
into an unstable, and unpredictable, process of policy framing in which alcohol
was posited variously as an issue of economics, leisure, health and policing.
Lack of departmental coherence, conflicting policy frames, unpredictable
media coverage and consistent pressure from industry to curtail regulation all
proved corrosive to efforts by New Labour to establish consensus on its
alcohol policies. Based on a survey of policy literature, media coverage and
Hansard records, as well as interviews with key figures, this article will look
at how the question of culture-change cut across debates on alcohol policy
between 2000 and 2011. In particular, it will consider how competing models of
culture-change, as well as the evident success of health-oriented culture-change
interventions such as the ban on smoking in public places, underpinned shifts
in the framing of alcohol policy debates over the period. From this perspective,
it will outline the key trends in public and political discourse as regards alcohol
policy in England and Wales (Scottish alcohol policy diverges so significantly
as to merit separate discussion), and it will consider what this reveals about
problems associated with both policymaking on alcohol and claims about
policy-driven cultural influence.
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2000–2003: Time for Reform
In 1998, Home Office minister George Howarth said that New Labour
intended to ‘blow away the cobwebs in British life’ by transforming alcohol
licensing (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 1998, p. 6). As John Greenaway has
shown, plans for licensing reform were initially driven by a desire to tidy up a
messy and convoluted area of market regulation; indeed, there was some initial
resistance to making cultural change part of the policy goal, and a key 1998
Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) report into licensing had explicitly
followed the Erroll Report in rejecting the notion that licensing could, or
should, target culture (BRTF, 1998; Greenaway, 2011). However, Howarth’s
language demonstrates the extent to which the idea of cultural modernisation
was embedded in the language of New Labour’s alcohol policy from the start.
Furthermore, New Labour’s decision to move responsibility for licensing from
the Home Office to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)
marked a new approach to political thinking around alcohol. Whereas pre-
viously, licensing was understood primarily as an issue of regulatory enforce-
ment and the prevention of antisocial behaviour, now it was to be an enabling
process – facilitating the development of a leisure economy and promoting
a culture of socialised consumption (Baggott, 2010).
The subsequent White Paper, Time for Reform (2000), set out the Govern-
ment’s proposals: licensing responsibilities would be moved from magistrates
to local authorities, fixed closing hours would be removed, the array of licences
covering both alcohol retail and public entertainment would be consolidated
into a simple system involving a single premise licence, and a personal licence
would be available to anyone over 18 who passed the requisite examination.
From a historical perspective, the transfer of licensing powers from the
magistracy (where they had sat since 1552) to local authorities was by far the
most radical proposal. Despite this, however, it was the relaxation of opening
hours that became the headline provision of Time for Reform. In 1972, the
Erroll Report had proposed opening hours between 10:00 and midnight, and
two later studies – one funded by the Home Office, the other by the Portman
Group – had argued that 11 o’clock closing exacerbated a culture of antisocial
behaviour and drunken violence (Tuck, 1989; Marsh and Fox-Kibby, 1992).
Relying heavily on these studies, Time for Reform insisted that not only were
fixed closing times anachronistic and bad for tourism, but that a relaxation
would lead to ‘significant reductions’ in drink-related crime and also
‘reductions in binge-drinking’ (DCMS, 2000, p. 68). The public goal of
removing fixed closing times was both business deregulation and culture-
change: as one Home Office Minister put it: ‘flexible licensing hours will help
tackle the problem of alcohol-related disorder by phasing closing times and
hopefully, in the longer term, encouraging a change in our drinking culture’
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(Berman and Danby, 2003, p. 13). More than anything, it was on this claim
that the subsequent legislation would be judged.
When the Licensing Bill was introduced to the House of Lords in November
2002, the Government emphasised that it was ‘about modernisation and
reform to stimulate a richer range of leisure opportunities for the consumer’
(HL Deb 26 November 2002 vol 642 c641-2). Underpinning this was the
assumption that problem drinking was confined to an identifiable minority,
and that the majority of moderate drinkers should be protected from state
intervention: a presumption which, as we shall see, ran counter to a ‘whole
population’ perspective then gaining ground among public health advocates.
According to Baroness Blackstone, Minister for Culture, Media and Sport,
while over 80 per cent of men and women drank the ‘vast majority behave
responsibly’, and the Bill would ‘remove perverse influences on drinking
culture, such as fixed, artificially early closing times that can lead to problems
of violence and binge drinking’ (HL Deb 26 November 2002 vol 642 c641-2).
Left to their own devices, the vast majority of drinkers would behave sensibly;
for those who didn’t, the Bill would ‘bring about a positive change in the drink-
ing culture of England and Wales’ (HL Deb 20 January 2003 vol 643 c477).
Initially, there was clear support for the relaxation of ‘outmoded’ opening
hours (HC Deb 15 November 2002 vol 394 c328; HL Deb 26 November
2002 vol 641 c647; HC Deb 24 March 2003 vol 402 c63) and the broad
Parliamentary consensus on relaxed opening hours was bolstered by early
support from the police, who accepted that fixed closing probably exacerbated
disorder (Times, 1998; HC Deb 15 November 2002 vol 394 cc316-7). However,
New Labour’s ‘modernising’ frame was always undermined by an alternative
perspective in media reporting of the policy: one in which cultural relaxation,
business deregulation and the ‘civilisation’ of drinking behaviours was presen-
ted instead as the promotion of irresponsible behaviour at an individual level,
a wilful naivety about the realities of British drinking culture, and the
dereliction of government responsibility towards the law-abiding majority.
Ever since it had been mooted in a 1998 BRTF report, the relaxation of
closing hours had commonly been referred to in the press as ‘24-hour drinking’
(for example, Times, 1998; Eastham, 1998; Morris, 2002).1 This gave an entirely
different perspective on the legislation which was seized on by opponents in
the subsequent months and years. While the Government strongly emphasised
crime reduction (for example, HC Deb 18 November 2002 vol 394 cc10-11), the
failure to successfully contain the media narrative of ‘24-hour drinking’ meant
that relaxed opening hours were routinely presented as an invitation simply to
drink more, rather than to drink more slowly.
Compounding this problem was the fact that the density and operating hours
of drinking outlets in city centres had increased significantly over the previous
decade. Partly as a consequence of attempts to regenerate post-industrial city
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centres, and partly as a result of powerful retail chains entering the market
following the 1990 Beer Orders, many city centres had already seen a
proliferation of large, high-turnover bars (sometimes referred to as ‘vertical
drinking establishments’), which opened until 2:00 thanks to the effective use of
Special Hours Certificates by operators (Hadfield, 2006). In effect, the attempt
by many local authorities to develop vibrant ‘24-hour cities’ with an emphasis
on the cultural industries had, in many cases, led to the creation of city-centre
zones dominated by an alcohol-fuelled night-time economy in which all other
leisure options were squeezed out (Measham and Brain, 2005; Hayward and
Hobbs, 2007).
Nevertheless, although the Bill had a difficult passage through the Lords, the
relaxation of opening hours was broadly supported, as was the transfer of
licensing powers from magistrates to local councils. Media debate on the Bill
was also muted: the day after Royal Assent, only the Daily Mirror reported
that the Act had passed into law – tellingly, under the headline ‘24-hour pubs
are closer’ (Daily Mirror, 2003). Despite its occasionally rocky journey through
Parliament, the 2003 Licensing Act emerged to limited public concern over its
potential impact on drinking behaviours.
2004–2006: Changing Perceptions
The enacting of the 2003 Licensing Act was a slow process, with implementa-
tion not scheduled until November 2005. While this period saw rising tensions
between the DCMS and the Home Office over policing and enforcement
(HC Deb 8 June 2004 vol 662 c223; Light, 2005a; Greenaway, 2011), it also
saw a marked increase in media reporting of alcohol issues and the beginnings
of a concerted campaign on alcohol policy from public health lobbyists.
Between enactment and implementation, public debates on alcohol shifted
dramatically.
A key issue was the promise of positive culture change. Scepticism had
long been expressed over the idea that flexible licensing would engineer a ‘cafe´
society’ in England (for example. HL Deb 26 November 2002 vol 641 c654;
Tighe, 2003). Ironically, however, it was the launch of the Government’s long-
delayed Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy in March 2004 – presented as
a joined-up correlative of the Licensing Act – that drew attention to the risks
that such an experiment posed (Greenaway, 2011). In 2003, the Strategy Unit
had published a preparatory study of the costs of alcohol misuse to the UK
economy (PMSU, 2003). Building on this evidence base, the Harm Reduction
Strategy acknowledged that alcohol misuse was ‘a very real problem’, noting
that alcohol was responsible for half of all violent crimes, 22 000 deaths
per year, 17 million lost working days and £95 million costs in specialist
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treatment (PMSU, 2004, p. 7). The ‘first key aim of the strategy’ was ‘to
improve the information available to individuals and to start the process of
change in the culture of drinking to get drunk’ (ibid, p. 22). However, health
campaigners immediately condemned the solutions the Strategy proposed, and
were furious that the government’s own research into effective policies for
reducing alcohol-related harm appeared to have been ignored (Institute of
Alcohol Studies, 2004).
At the heart of the Harm Reduction Strategy were funding for alcohol
education, media awareness campaigns, and voluntary partnership with the
alcohol industry to promote sensible drinking. However, health campaigners
had long been calling for supply-side interventions such as increased taxation
and restrictions on retail, and many were angry that proposals for macro-
economic restrictions that had appeared in the research briefing for the
Strategy were missing from the final document. Publication of the Harm
Reduction Strategy was, according to the then Registrar (and later, President)
of the Royal College of Physicians, Sir Ian Gilmore, ‘a low point in that our
expectations had really been built up by a superb evidence gathering processy
but then [the Government] unfortunately, ignored it’ (interview). Writing
shortly afterwards, one leading public health researcher, Robin Room, described
the demand-side measures adopted in the Strategy as ‘a recipe for ineffective-
ness’ in dealing with alcohol-related harm (Room, 2004, p. 1083).
In backing industry self-regulation and education, New Labour very publicly
rejected the ‘public health’ approach which had been promoted by alcohol
health campaigners since the mid-1970s (Thom, 1999; Plant and Plant, 2006).
The public health model asserted that consumption needed to be reduced
across whole populations (as opposed to simply among problematic mino-
rities), and should be achieved through increased taxation and stricter licensing
controls (Edwards et al, 1994; Babor et al, 2003). Fundamentally, the popula-
tion approach argued that while Government action couldn’t by itself change
culture, the State nevertheless had a duty to act on those contextual features
which it could change: specifically affordability (through taxation) and
availability (through licensing). New Labour explicitly rejected both the public
health model and its associated policies, adopting instead the ‘voluntarist’ app-
roach favoured by, among others, the alcohol industry. This model assumed
that harms were largely confined to a minority and that demand-side inter-
ventions were the appropriate policy response (PMSU, 2004, pp. 21, 23).
In March 2004, coinciding with publication of the Harm Reduction Strategy,
the Academy of Medical Sciences launched a report setting out evidence that
both consumption and harm had increased dramatically in the preceding
decades, and calling forcefully for the adoption of public health approaches to
alcohol policy (AMS, 2004). The AMS report was seen by a number of its
authors as a turning point: for Sir Ian Gilmore it was ‘when I really cottoned
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on to the fact that factors like pricing, availability and marketing were y
where the evidence lay for what could actually change consumption’, while
Robin Room felt it marked the point where, in addition to psychiatrists,
‘public health and general internal medicine really began to take [alcohol]
seriously in Britain’ (interviews). The AMS report insisted that drinking
cultures were influenced by price and availability, and that the social and
economic costs of alcohol to the society at large more than justified Govern-
ment intervention in the alcohol market. Elsewhere, public health experts
lined up to accuse New Labour of adopting policies which ran counter to the
available evidence on the drivers of alcohol-related harm (Babor, 2004;
Marmot, 2004; Stockwell, 2004). The government claimed it wanted to ‘walk
the tightrope between liberalisation and laissez-faire’ (HC Deb 24 March 2003
vol 402 c52); for an increasing number of public health advocates it had simply
abdicated its proper responsibility for protecting the public good.
Consumption data seemed to bear out the warnings from public health:
average weekly consumption had been increasing throughout the early 2000s,
and reached a peak between 2002 and 2004 – a trend that reflected both
increasing affordability and weakening licensing constraints (Lader and Steel,
2010, p. 22).2 However, while the AMS and others sought to frame alcohol
policy debates around long-term health consequences, news reporting began to
focus increasingly on the issue of antisocial behaviour. In January 2004, the
Sunday Times published an article entitled ‘Street violence jumps in binge
Britain’ (Iredale, 11 Jan 2004): coining a slogan which would become inextri-
cably tied to New Labour’s alcohol policy, but which also tapped into deep-
seated assumptions about British drinking behaviours. By the end of the year,
the phrase ‘Binge Britain’ was used in stories published in the Daily Mirror
(16 August), the Observer (5 September) and the Daily Mail (12 July and
18 December). The day before the Harm Reduction Strategy was launched, the
Sunday Times reported leaked Home Office papers expressing concern over
drunken violence (Winnett and Leppard, 14 March 2004). Six days later, a
leaked Metropolitan Police report revealed concerns over the impact of flexible
hours on crime and disorder (Johnston, 2004). The Home Secretary, David
Blunkett, described binge drinking as a ‘major scourge’ – revealing widespread
misgivings in the Home Office about the policy (HC Deb 10 May 2004 vol 421
c16; Greenaway, 2011). Tony Blair, meanwhile, attempted to demonstrate
that New Labour took industry responsibilities seriously by trailing a plan to
charge retailers for the cost of policing in city centres (an idea favoured by the
Home Secretary); however, when Blair warned that binge drinking risked
becoming the ‘new British disease’, it merely raised questions as to why
licensing was being liberalised when the Prime Minister and Home Secretary
both accepted that heavy drinking was a significant cultural problem (BBC,
2004a; Wilson, 2004).
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Partly in response to growing concerns, the Government published a cross-
departmental consultation paper, Drinking Responsibly (2005), setting out
plans to strengthen police and local authority enforcement powers. Drinking
Responsibly also promised to ‘support the industry in working towards ending
all promotions that encourage speed drinking’ – but with the critical caveat
that ‘normal price competitiony should not be put in doubt’ (DCMS, 2005,
p. 14). Drinking Responsibly illustrated many key characteristics of New
Labour’s alcohol policy. It affirmed the primacy of the market and the tenet
that the principles of free competition should apply to alcohol as to other
commodities. It asserted that problematic drinking was limited to an irres-
ponsible minority, and that this minority should be dealt with in isolation from
the broader alcohol market. It posited alcohol harm both as a matter of anti-
social behaviour and as a demand-side issue, to be dealt with through
strengthened law enforcement, not supply-side interventions. And it insisted
that where marginal constraints were to be placed on suppliers (such as
regulating irresponsible promotions) this should be done on a voluntary, self-
regulating basis rather than through statutory requirements. New Labour’s
alcohol policy was premised on giving responsible adults maximum choice –
because ‘autonomy is a right, not a privilege’ (Jowell, 2004) – and tackling
problematic externalities at the level of the individual miscreant.
Such a liberal model of social policy might have been expected to go down
well with traditionally right-wing sections of the press. However, the press
narrative of 24-hour drinking posited those freedoms as being bequeathed
upon sectors of society often viewed with suspicion and anxiety by those same
newspapers. Binge drinking, as popularly conceived, was youth drinking:
indeed, the Harm Reduction Strategy defined ‘binge drinkers’ as ‘those who
are likely to get drunk and are likely to be under 25’ (PMSU, 2004, p. 7). News
reporting of ‘binge Britain’ routinely used images of young people, to the
extent that many have asked whether it is best understood as a classic ‘moral
panic’ over youthful transgression rather than a coherent critique of alcohol
policy (Measham and Brain, 2005; Borsay, 2007; Hayward and Hobbs, 2007;
Critcher, 2008; Yeomans, 2009; Nicholls, 2011a). For the government, this
focus on individual miscreants matched entirely their model of harm, in which
problems were isolated among a small number of binge and chronic drinkers
(PMSU, 2004, pp. 7–8). However, even though that model was broadly
accepted outside the public health community, the threat those particular
miscreants posed proved disastrous for efforts to present the liberalisation of
licensing hours as a responsible course of action. By the time the Act came into
force on the 24 November 2005, media reporting was overwhelmingly negative:
the Daily Express was not out of step with much of the coverage when, the day
before implementation, it prophesied an ‘explosion of binge-boozing from
tonight’ (Price and Blacklock, 2005).
Alcohol policy and cultural change in England since 2000
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2006–2008: A New Focus on Health
New Labour failed to establish a dedicated procedure for monitoring the
effects of the 2003 Licensing Act (Hadfield, 2007); however, published reviews
presented a mixed picture. One concluded that the effects of the Licensing Act
have been ‘largely neutral in terms of alcohol-related harms’ (Foster et al, 2009,
p. 119). Another found that, on average, operating hours increased by just
21min (Hough et al, 2008, p. ii). While the Home Affairs Committee reported
a ‘strong perception among police forces that alcohol-related violence is on the
increase’ (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008, p. 36), other studies pointed
to a flatlining, or even a small decline, in alcohol-related crime (Babb, 2007;
Hough et al, 2008), though these figures may mask significant differences
between urban and rural areas (Roberts and Eldridge, 2007; Hadfield and
Measham, 2010; Humphreys and Eisner, 2010). Some studies showed little
change in admissions to alcohol and emergency departments (Durnford et al,
2008; Hough et al, 2008), while other data suggested a dramatic increase in
overall hospital admissions for alcohol-related conditions (HC Deb 21 April
2009 vol 491 c572w). While police support for the Act fell away in 2004–2005
(White, 2005), subsequent reviews found police support for many of the new
powers – especially the powers to trigger licence reviews and impose Drink
Banning Orders (Herring et al, 2008, p. 261; Hadfield et al, 2009, p. 472).
In terms of consumption, the anticipated ‘explosion in binge-boozing’ did
not materialise – indeed, overall consumption levels began to decline from
around 2005, albeit it from a historically high peak (Health Committee, 2010,
p. 17; ONS, 2011). However, there was scant evidence of the significant
reduction in harm that had been promised – nor of any shift towards a more
sensible drinking culture. Consequently, New Labour were unable to counter
the ‘Binge Britain’ media narrative with evidence that their promise of positive
cultural change was anything other than empty rhetoric. Furthermore, New
Labour’s declining popularity made alcohol policy an attractive target for
sceptical journalists: according to one senior Civil Servant:
it was around the time of Iraq, the government was unpopular, the right
wing press were into a position where they wanted to give Blair a kicking,
and in those sorts of circumstances it was quite easy for the Daily Mail
to switch from ‘pubs are open all day what a wonderful thing’ to ‘yet
more opportunities for our youth to get bladdered and beat each other
up’. (interview)
Put on the defensive, a raft of subsequent legislation was introduced to tackle
public drunkenness: in 2006, Alcohol Disorder Zones were included in the
Violent Crime Reduction Act – though these were widely condemned as
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‘unduly bureaucratic’, and none were ever established (Merits of Statutory
Instruments Committee, 2008, p. 3); Drink Banning Orders, introduced at the
same time, were better received and widely used (Hadfield et al, 2009, p. 472).
In 2007, the Harm Reduction Strategy was updated and re-launched under
the title Safe. Sensible. Social, though health campaigners saw little in it to
suggest a move towards public health approaches (Anderson, 2007). However,
the updated strategy introduced two key developments. Firstly, it formalised
the creation of ‘Drinkaware’ an industry-funded charity whose remit was to
promote a change in drinking culture through education, awareness and public
information campaigns. Drinkaware had both industry and health representa-
tives on its board; however, it further confirmed that demand-side interven-
tions – particularly education – were at the heart of New Labour’s approaches
to culture change, while the supply-side measures favoured by public health
campaigners continued to be rejected. Secondly, the updated strategy
established more stringent data-gathering for alcohol harms in the NHS.
According to the then Minister for Public Health, Dawn Primarolo, in a
climate where public debates on alcohol were contradictory and often
confused, improved data-gathering ‘was important for policy development,
to actually be able to say “this is what the figures are showing us” ’ (interview).
However, the generation of detailed data sets on hospital admissions and
alcohol-attributable mortality also proved a powerful weapon in the armoury
of alcohol health lobbyists.
As we have seen, Government action on alcohol was spurred not only
by media reporting of ‘Binge Britain’, but by a well-coordinated advocacy
campaign on the part of health campaigners, who had become ‘more strident,
more frustrated probably, after the 2004 strategy [and] prepared to be more
outspoken’ (Gilmore, interview). In 2007, Gilmore established the Alcohol
Health Alliance, made up of 24 organisations including the Royal Colleges
of Physicians, Surgeons, Psychiatrists, GPs and Nurses as well as specialist
health groups such as the British Liver Trust and organisations such as Alcohol
Concern and the Institute of Alcohol Studies. Gilmore was active in promo-
ting alcohol issues to ministers at the Department of Health and became a
regular contributor to news reports on alcohol. Indeed, the success the Alcohol
Health Alliance achieved in influencing the news agenda can be measured
by the extent to which health practitioners such as Gilmore became primary
sources for news stories on alcohol in the late 2000s (Nicholls, 2011a).
This combination of medical authority and media profile made Gilmore
a formidable figure. According to a senior Civil Servant in the Department of
Health:
if Ian [Gilmore] is regularly getting into the Daily Mail as the voice of
reason, then you’ve got a problem. So, in that sense I think it began
Alcohol policy and cultural change in England since 2000
259r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1746-918X British Politics Vol. 7, 3, 250–271
to put alcohol on the agenday Ian had an open door because he was the
president of a Royal College, but he would have been invited in a lot
more often because of the profile he was getting. (interview)
Furthermore, the success of the ban on smoking in public places provided
impetus to alcohol health campaigners buoyed by – and influenced by – the
success of colleagues in smoking cessation. It also reinforced the perception
among key political figures and journalists that alcohol presented the next big
public health challenge (Kevin Barron MP, interview). In November 2008,
the Public Health Minister, Dawn Primarolo, stated that there was ‘a very
strong argument that problem drinking is becoming the new smoking in terms
of the challenges that it presents to public health’ (Primarolo, 2008): a speech
which, according to one senior health reporter at the BBC, ‘really made me go
away and think about what was going on [in alcohol policy] and start noticing
some of the things shifting around the debate’ as health campaigners turned
their attention from cigarettes to alcohol (interview). Later the same year, in
his Annual Report, the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Liam Donaldson, drew
a direct parallel between anti-smoking and alcohol health campaigning, writing
that ‘passive drinking’ was ‘a concept whose time had come’ (Chief Medical
Officer, 2009, p. 19), and calling for supply-side restrictions on pricing and
availability. Although the phrase ‘passive drinking’ failed to gain traction in
public debates, Donaldson’s attempt to position alcohol regulation as the
natural successor to restrictive legislation on smoking (which he had done
much to promote) is telling (Burgess, 2009).
Alcohol health campaigners also targeted both the political and media
agenda through a series of high-profile reports which set out a consistent policy
line. In 2008, the BMA published Alcohol Misuse: Tackling the UK Epidemic –
which, like the AMS report four years earlier, promoted a public health
approach and insisted that the harm reduction evidence-base pointed clearly
towards increasing price and reducing access (BMA, 2008). Alcohol Concern
published a review of the Harm Reduction Strategy which also called for
increased alcohol taxation (Diment et al, 2007). In 2009, a BMA report on
alcohol advertising reasserted the public health approach, while calling for
further restrictions on marketing (BMA, 2009). Alcohol policy campaigners
also achieved a degree of influence at policy development level: when the
Conservative-led Social Justice Policy Group produced a lengthy study of
social breakdown, it commissioned the Institute of Alcohol Studies (an
organisation founded in 1983 by the United Kingdom Temperance Alliance) to
review drink policy, and accepted their conclusion that pricing strategies were
needed to reduce overall consumption (Gyngell, 2007, pp. 99–101).
Although beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that
public health perspectives did become established in the alcohol policies of the
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devolved government in Scotland. There, the Scottish National Party adopted
a distinct approach to alcohol from that taken by the previously dominant
Scottish Labour Party. The 2005 Licensing (Scotland) Act included the
‘protection of public health’ as a statutory licensing objective; later, the 2010
Alcohol etc. Act imposed restrictions on retail discounts and promotions that
went far beyond those attempted through voluntary agreements in England
and Wales. The acceptance of public health approaches by the Scottish
Nationalists is notable in that the challenge of changing Scottish drinking
culture has been adopted by the ruling administration as a measure of the
power of devolved decision-making.
While news reporting of antisocial behaviour focussed much political attention
on alcohol problems, health campaigners were also keen to address the rise in
domestic drinking and supermarket sales – which, in reality, represented the key
cultural trend in post-war British drinking cultures (Nicholls, 2011b). In 2007,
new social research suggested that ‘pre-loading’ had become an established part
of drinking culture, and that the drunkenness witnessed on the streets of major
cities was often arrived at before drinkers had even left their houses (Hughes et al,
2007). Some young people may have been drinking in pubs, but alcohol was both
cheaper and easier to access in off-licences and supermarkets – especially where
proxy-buying took place. Giving evidence to the Health Select Committee in
2009, the sociologist Martin Plant described supermarkets as exhibiting ‘the
morality of the crack dealer’ – a claim which was widely reported in the press the
following day, and which provided an epigraph to the Health Committee report
into alcohol when it was published in January 2010 (Health Committee, 2010;
also see Bolger, 2009, Kaniuk, 2009; Martin, 2009).
In May 2008, the Department of Health launched a units awareness
campaign aimed at middle class drinkers and those who drank at home: an
acknowledgement that the primary consumers of alcohol were in professional
and managerial positions, and that more alcohol was drunk at home than
elsewhere (Lader, 2009, pp. 32–33). According to the Minister responsible there
‘was a public perception that it’s a youth issue or that somehow you had to be
an alcoholic to have a drink problemy and that everybody else thought they
were handling it’, when the reality was that not only did most drinking take
place in the home, but the increased strength of drinks meant people had little
idea how much they were consuming (interview).
The increasing awareness of the role of home consumption and supermarket
sales also contributed to renewed debates on alcohol pricing. In 2003, the
Labour peer Lord Davies of Oldham had acknowledged that ‘the overriding
factor that determines the amount of alcohol people consume is its price in
relation to their disposable income’, but the following year his colleague Lord
McIntosh of Haringey insisted that ‘the idea that we should intervene to raise
pricesy is a little remote from the ethos of the time’ (HL Deb 20 January 2003
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vol 643 c478; HL Deb 11 November 2004 vol 666 c1018). By 2008, however,
that ethos had shifted significantly. In that year’s Budget, the Chancellor,
Alistair Darling, announced a 6 per cent rise in duties on alcohol in the annual
Budget, with further 2 per cent rises above inflation over the subsequent four
years (HC Deb 12 March 2008 vol 473 c298).
Many in the pub trade objected that tax rises would do nothing to tackle
cheap alcohol in supermarkets, which could absorb duties rises and continue to
use alcohol as a ‘loss leader’ (Champ, 2008). However, the Budget coincided
with the publication of a Home Office-commissioned review of alcohol pricing
which drew attention to a novel approach pricing mechanism which seemed
able to overcome that anomaly. Minimum unit pricing (as opposed to the use
of taxation) was first proposed in a report by Scottish Health Action on
Alcohol Problems in 2007 (Gillan and Macnaughton, 2007), but swiftly gained
support among public health researchers and lobbyists. The following year,
a Home Office review of pricing interventions found ‘low quality but demon-
strable evidence to suggest that minimum pricing might be effective as a tar-
geted public health policy’: reducing consumption overall, but especially
among young binge-drinkers (Booth et al, 2008, p. 6).
Minimum pricing seemed to overcome the intractable problem of super-
markets selling alcohol cheaply in order to draw in customers. However, when
the Chief Medical Officer formally endorsed the idea in March 2009
(Donaldson, 2009, p. 25), Gordon Brown and David Cameron swiftly and
very publicly rejected the recommendations, with both citing the injustice of
punishing the majority of moderate drinkers for the excesses of a minority
(Nicholls, 2011a). Nevertheless, in November 2008, the Home Affairs Select
Committee came out in support (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008, pp.
42–43); in January 2010 the Health Select Committee made it one of the central
recommendations in their extensive report on alcohol (Health Committee,
2010, p. 116), and in June 2010 the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence called for minimum pricing in its guidance on harmful drinking
(NICE, 2010, p. 9). Trade interests were divided on the issue. The brewers SAB
Miller commissioned the Centre for Economic and Business Research to assess
the idea, and it concluded that minimum pricing was a ‘blunt instrument’ that
would have ‘very limited benefits in curbing the excesses of the minority’
(Health Committee, 2010, p. 108). By contrast, the Campaign for Real Ale
supported the idea, as it would level the playing field between supermarkets
and pubs (Health Committee, 2010, p. 112).
When Liam Donaldson wrote that ‘passive drinking’ was an idea whose time
had come, he was mistaken (Burgess, 2009). However, when he backed
minimum unit pricing, he was supporting an idea that became established with
remarkable speed. The swift rise to prominence of this previously unknown
(and untried) strategy reflects the impact of the public health campaign to
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make affordability the centrepiece of public policy on alcohol (at the time of
writing, minimum unit pricing is close to being introduced in Scotland at a level
of 50p per unit). However, the political resonance of minimum unit pricing also
reflected a major shift in public perceptions over the root causes of excessive
drinking. Whereas the media outcry in 2004 had centred on drinking in
pubs and bars, by 2008 it had become clear that a primary source of alcohol
harms was not the on-trade, but off-sales in supermarkets – where conven-
tional licensing interventions had only a limited impact.
2008–2010: Mixed Messages
Despite a long-term decline in overall levels of alcohol consumption, as well
as declining pub numbers, Conservative politicians seized upon the Licensing
Act as a paradigm of failed social policy. This was partly motivated by political
opportunism (Greenaway, 2011), but it also fitted neatly into the narrative
of ‘Broken Britain’ which had been adopted by the Conservatives under
David Cameron. In a speech to the 2009 Conservative conference, the shadow
Home Secretary Chris Grayling, promised to tackle antisocial behaviour
by ‘tear[ing] up this Government’s lax licensing regime’ (Grayling, 2009) –
a promise repeated by the new Home Secretary, Theresa May, the following
year (May, 2010). In August 2010, just three months after coming to power –
and having already moved responsibility for alcohol licensing back to the
Home Office – the Coalition launched a consultation on ‘rebalancing’ the 2003
Licensing Act which proposed a number of provisions, many of which had
been tabled as amendments to the original Bill: a levy on operators who opened
late at night to cover the extra costs of policing, including local authorities as
‘responsible bodies’, increased penalties for underage sales, greater powers to
impose fixed closing times, and including health authorities as responsible
bodies – thereby allowing health bodies to launch objections to licensing
applications (though it stopped short of following the example of Scotland,
where the protection of public health was enshrined as a licensing objective
under the 2005 Licensing (Scotland) Act). It also proposed a ban on the below-
cost sale of alcohol in supermarkets (Home Office, 2012).
It is a measure of the political consensus around the perceived failure of the
2003 Licensing Act that, despite vociferous trade objections, the provisions
set out in the Home Office consultation not only made it into the Policing
and Social Responsibility Bill unchanged, but that the amendments passed
through Parliament equally smoothly (see Coulson, 2010; Leek, 2010; Turney,
2010b; Harrington, 2010 for trade responses). The ‘rebalanced’ Licensing Act
appeared to signal a clear desire within the Coalition to use licensing legislation
as a means of tackling problematic drinking cultures.
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At the same time, however, the Department of Health took a very different
approach. Published in the same week as the Policing and Social Responsibility
Bill, the Department of Health White Paper, Healthy Lives, Healthy People
proposed tackling alcohol-related harm through ‘nudging’ and self-regulatory
‘Responsibility Deals’ rather than statutory action (Department of Health,
2010). The Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, talked about
‘tearing up’ the 2003 Act and insisted that, while ‘regulation doesn’t work’,
partnership with industry, and the ‘nudging’ of social norms, did (Wilmore,
2010). Although the Lord’s Science and Technology Committee would later
express scepticism towards the evidence that ‘nudging’ worked as a driver of
cultural change, the strategy was welcomed by the head of Drinkaware as
evidence that ‘Big Society’ policies could ‘solve the problem of binge drinking’
(House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2011; also see Sorek,
2010).
In the end, the launch of the Responsibility Deal in March 2011 was severely
undermined when six major public health organisations – including the BMA,
the British Liver Trust and the Royal College of Physicians – refused to sign
up. According to the then Chief Executive of the British Liver Trust, Alison
Rogers, the discussions towards the Deal were ‘abysmally badly doney [the
Department of Health] made no real attempt to make it feel like anything other
than bi-partisan government with us tacked on to make it feel rubber-stamped’
(interview). After ‘all sorts of negotiations about whether to withdraw from
the deal and whether to do it publicly, and whether to do it just before the
event so the media had the story’, the major public health signatories pulled
out on the eve of the announcement of the Deal, insisting that it was ‘not
acceptable for the drinks industry to drive the pace and direction that such
public health policy takes’ (Rogers, interview; Boseley, 2011).
Once again, the instincts of different Government departments clashed over
alcohol policy, as did the political rhetoric. While the Home Office risked
alienating the pub trade in its desire to show that Government could legislate
to tackle antisocial cultures, the Department of Health alienated the alcohol
health community in its desire to assert that changing culture was a matter of
personal choice and persuasion. Of course, the policy debate on alcohol is
shaped not only by models of behaviour change but by the relative desire of
departments to protect the rights and interests of economic sectors, and here
it appeared the supermarkets – who are largely unaffected by amendments
to the Licensing Act, but affected by price interventions – had considerably
more political weight than the once-mighty, but increasingly beleaguered, pub
trade.
The publication of the Coalition Government’s Alcohol Strategy (GAS) in
March 2012, however, included the headline (and largely unexpected) announce-
ment that minimum unit pricing for alcohol would become government policy,
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superseding the previous policy of simply banning below-cost sales (Home Office,
2010). At the time of writing, consultations on the level at which a minimum price
per unit would be set are ongoing and methods for evaluating its impact on
behaviour remain unclear. However, its adoption marks the acceptance of a key
public health principle: that alcohol is, indeed, ‘no ordinary commodity’. It also
shows a change in political calculation since Cameron rejected the policy in 2009
– one influenced by the lack of electoral damage minimum unit pricing appeared
to cause the Scottish National Party in the 2010 General Election. Whatever the
short-term effects on consumption, this represents a shift in the political framing
of alcohol which, especially if other countries follow the UK’s lead, could have
significant long-term repercussions.
Conclusion: Alcohol Policy and Culture Change
The Strategy Unit discussion paper Achieving Culture Change (2008) identifies
consistency of policy narratives as a key to shaping social norms and changing
behaviour (Knott et al, 2008, p. 10). However, alcohol policy has historically
been dogged by a failure to reconcile the competing principles of individual
freedom and social responsibility which alcohol throws into relief – just as it
has struggled to reconcile the competing interests of both stakeholders and
government departments. The story of alcohol policy since 2000 is no different:
by seeking to conspicuously extend the freedoms of moderate drinkers, while
acknowledging the threat of binge drinking, New Labour exposed itself to the
claim that it was doing neither. The media narrative of ‘Binge Britain’ implied,
instead, that New Labour’s alcohol policy was lifting the constraints on binge
drinkers while making life more difficult for the moderate majority. However, the
alternative model – the public health approach favoured by public health
campaigners – risks appearing to punish the majority of moderate drinkers for
the excesses of the minority. Political sensitivity to this was clearly illustrated by
the rejection of the Chief Medical Officer’s minimum unit price proposals in 2009,
and by the fact that the minimum unit pricing was presented in the 2012 GAS as
a measure to tackle ‘the scourge of violence caused by binge drinking’, when it is,
in reality, an instrument targeting long-term health impacts and population-level
consumption (Home Office, 2012, p. 2). Overlaying this is the fact that alcohol
consumption is, in its essence, a cultural practice: an activity predominantly
carried out in groups, in which both consumption and behaviour are inextricably
tied to cultural norms and learnt behaviours. Alcohol policy, therefore, is policy
directed at culture; albeit culture mediated by powerful market interests.
Alcohol presents a number of intractable problems for policymakers. It is
cross-departmental in a way which tends towards the creation of competing
silos rather than joined-up government (Baggott, 1990, 2010), it also sets the
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economic benefits of a thriving alcohol industry against enormous costs to the
public finances arising from policing and health care. However, it is also an
issue which throws into relief the problematic relationship between policy and
culture: both the cultural values and presuppositions (often codified in media
reporting) which frame policymaking and popular responses to policy, and the
vexed question of whether and how policy can drive changes in cultural
attitudes. The last decade has demonstrated how difficult it is to reform alcohol
policy without being drawn into making risky claims about cultural change;
it has shown the extent to which politicians fear that alcohol interventions will
be perceived as ‘nanny state’ attacks on personal freedom; and it has shown
how alcohol policy speaks directly to cultural assumptions about the nature of
alcohol as a commodity, and the role of the state in regulating markets more
broadly.
While it is accepted that ‘behaviour change often – if not always – lies at the
heart of complex policy issues’ (Halpern et al, 2004, p. 5), the challenge posed
by alcohol is that drinking involves behaviour inextricably bound to cultural
norms. Those norms are not static, as the decades of low consumption in the
early twentieth century demonstrate; nor are they impervious to policy
interventions (Health Committee, 2010). Public health campaigners would
argue that Government should use those instruments which it can control –
taxation levels, licensing restrictions and marketing regulation – to make an
impact; the drinks industry, by contrast, insists that education and responsible
retail are key. New Labour failed to strike a balance that achieved political
credibility, and they were not the first administration to make that mistake.
It remains to be seen whether the Coalition will fare any better.
Notes
1 Between 2000 and 2005, the phrase ‘24-hour drinking’ appears 956 times in all UK national
newspapers. By contrast, the phrase ‘extended opening hours’ appears 157 times and ‘flexible
licensing’ 28 times (search carried out using Newsbank press archive).
2 Reported consumption appears to increase sharply after 2007, but this is due to a recalibration of
the number of units taken to be contained in an average glass of wine and new data on wine glass
sizes (Goddard, 2007).
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